




C limate C hange:   
C onsensus on the long-r un tar gets – but will we get policies that deliver ?  
 
• To favour action on climate change is part of the political consensus across all major 
parties. All have signed up to legally binding targets for greenhouse gas emissions of a 
34% reduction by 2022 and an 80% reduction by 2050 relative to 1990 levels.  
 
• In line with the Kyoto protocol, compared with 1990, UK emissions have been 
reduced by more than 12.5%. But the UK has failed to meet its own target of a 20% 
cut by 2010. Things look even worse if the measure of carbon emissions includes 
consumption by UK residents, rather than simply emissions occurring in the UK. 
 
• To meet the targets efficiently, carbon prices must rise. While the UK has various 
policy initiatives to establish such a price signal, the price incurred by different types 
of emitters differs widely. Even the strongest price signals are relatively weak, and 
there is considerable uncertainty about the future path of carbon pricing.  
 
• The reform plans of the Climate Change Levy proposed by the Conservatives and the 
Liberal Democrats would address some of these concerns by creating a floor price for 
the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme. The LibDems’ plans are more 
radical – extending the levy to non-business users. Both parties stop short, however, 
of specifying how high this floor price should be. 
 
• All parties have proposals for ‘clean’ generation technologies with varying levels of 
support depending on the type of technology. Labour and the Conservatives support 
further nuclear power plants whereas the LibDems are opposed to nuclear.  
 
• Giving differential support to different technologies risks inefficiencies and 
unnecessary costs. Support for renewable technologies could be integrated with 
establishing a carbon price. The floor for the carbon price could be indexed to fossil 
fuel prices, both to hedge the risk and to avoid excessive profits in the event of future 
oil price hikes. 
 
• A carbon price will be fiscally regressive and the parties lack practical proposals to 
address this. The simplest measure could be to channel all revenue arising from 









To be in favour of action on climate change is clearly in the mainstream. This is reflected not 
only in the policy positions of the parties, but also in construction activity at the party leaders’ 
homes – David Cameron temporarily installed a wind turbine on his house a couple of years 
back while Gordon Brown says he has been experimenting with solar panels. 
 
Labour’s plans were outlined in a White Paper in 2008, which subsequently led to various 
bills in parliament that were supported by the opposition parties. The Conservatives’ ‘Low 
Carbon Economy Security, Stability and Green Growth’1 and the LibDems’ ‘Zero Carbon 
Britain – Taking a Global Lead’2 papers are often hard to distinguish from similar 
government material.3 But there are some important differences, and a high degree of 




The performance so far 
 
The overall shape of UK climate change policy is currently outlined by the 2008 Climate 
Change Act, which was backed by the opposition parties. The act requires a 34% reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2022 and an 80% reduction by 2050 relative to 1990 levels.5
 
 
The act was clearly an important milestone both nationally and internationally in climate 
change policy-making in that it made greenhouse gas targets legally binding and established 
an independent expert panel – the Committee on Climate Change6
 
 – to monitor progress 
towards these targets and propose more specific policies needed to meet them. Nevertheless, 
it remains to be seen if the commitment continues as the costs to UK voters increase. 
Compared with 1990, the UK has reduced greenhouse gas emissions by more than 12.5%, 
which is in line with the target under the Kyoto protocol. But the UK has failed to meet a 
separate target – proposed by the government – to reduce carbon emissions by 20% in 2010. 
 
The performance of the UK looks dramatically worse when taking account of emissions from 
tourism and emissions embedded in trade. Many goods imported to the UK, such as 
manufactured goods from China, are energy-intensive in production, and it makes sense to 
count the emissions that UK residents consume rather than simply the emissions that actually 
arise on UK territory. 
 
                                                 
1 http://www.conservatives.com/~/media/Files/Green%20Papers/Environment_Policy_Paper.ashx?dl=true 
2 http://www.libdems.org.uk/siteFiles/resources/PDF/Zero_Carbon_Britain.pdf  
3 For example, the ‘Low carbon transition plan’ 
(http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/publications/lc_trans_plan/lc_trans_plan.aspx) 
4 There is also some last minute repositioning. For example, ‘Rebuilding Security – Conservative Energy Policy 
for an Uncertain World’ from Spring 2010 contradicts in parts the strategy outlined in ‘Low Carbon Economy 
Security, Stability and Green Growth’. The remarks in this briefing refer to the more recent statements in those 
cases (http://www.conservatives.com/~/media/Files/Green%20Papers/Rebuilding-Security.ashx?dl=true). 
5 1990 is the reference year used in the Kyoto Protocol. 
6 http://www.theccc.org.uk/ 
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According to some estimates, UK greenhouse gas emissions may have risen by 19% or more 
since 1990. Figure 1 shows the path of greenhouse gases emitted on UK territory as well as 
the implied greenhouse gas emissions caused by UK residents. 
 
Figure 1: UK Greenhouse gas emissions since 1990 by various measurement approaches 
 
Note: Bunker emissions refer to emissions from international shipping and aviation departing from the UK  
Source: Helm et al, 2007 
 
 
The quest for a stable, single and sufficiently high carbon price  
 
From an economic point of view, the most important policy measure to address climate 
change is imposing a price on greenhouse gas emissions using a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade 
scheme. This forces consumers and businesses rather than governments to figure out the most 
efficient way to achieve a given reduction in emissions using their private knowledge of costs 
and opportunities. 
 
Thus consumers might choose to consume less of certain products or switch from a petrol-
driven car to an electric vehicle. Businesses might decide to adjust their input mix or seize the 
opportunity and invest in research and development (R&D) to invent new less polluting 
products for which there is now a market. Because a given unit of emissions has the same 
effect on global warming irrespective of where it is emitted, the price imposed on a given unit 
should be the same globally as far as is possible. 
 
Considering the current state of the global negotiations after the United Nations Climate 
Change Summit in Copenhagen in December 2009, we are still a long way from a globally 
harmonised price. But even within the UK, there is huge variation in the price imposed on 
different units of emissions. 
 
Figure 2 shows the implied cost per tonne of CO2 for a number of different types of CO2 
emissions by industry. The variation is even wider when other types of emissions are 
considered: for example, residential gas faces no carbon penalty at all.  
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Figure 2: Selected costs per tonne of CO2 (£/tonne of CO2) in the UK 
Via Renew able Obligation for about 10% of electricity supply
Business Sector Coal via reduced Climate Change Levy  Rate
Business Sector Coal full Climate Change Levy  Rate
Business Sector Gas  reduced Climate Change Levy Rate
Business Sector Gas  via the full Climate Change Levy Rate
EUETS 2008 Average
EUETS 2009 Average
0 10 20 30 40 50 60  
Source: author’s calculations based on EU ETS data, DEFRA data 
 
 
One important argument for differential pricing is that some sectors would suffer in their 
competitiveness since not all countries have such stringent measures. Thus many companies 
enjoyed a reduced Climate Change Levy (CCL)7
 
 under a scheme known as Climate Change 
Agreements (CCA). This explains the difference between the reduced and full rates for gas 
and coal in Figure 2. The most comprehensive econometric evaluation study of the CCL finds 
no support for this argument (Martin et al, 2009).  
Generally, carbon prices in the UK are fairly low. For example, even the highest carbon cost 
reported in Figure 2 of £48 (buyout price under the ‘renewable obligation’ scheme) is only 
about half of the lowest similar scheme in Germany. 
 
The renewable obligation is a requirement for electricity suppliers to source a fraction of their 
electricity from renewable energy. But instead of actually sourcing renewable energy, they 
can simply pay the government a fixed rate per kWh of electricity, which translates into the 
rate shown in Figure 2 using the carbon emitted on average from non-renewable electricity. 
 
Germany uses instead a system of ‘feed-in tariffs’ whereby grid operators are required by a 
law to pay renewable energy suppliers a fixed rate for electricity that they supply to the grid. 
This rate varies by type of renewable energy. But even for onshore wind, which receives the 
lowest support, the implied cost per tonne of carbon is around £100. 
 
The low support rate, coupled with the option of being able to buy out rather than deliver, is 
the likely reason why – despite having some of the best renewable resources in Europe, such 
as wind – the UK is not only lagging far behind other countries in the share of electricity 
sourced from renewables but also behind the relatively modest targets set by the government 
in the past (Figure 3).8
 
  
                                                 
7 The CCL is a key part of the UK government’s efforts to curb business sector emissions. It implies various 
taxes on fuel inputs for businesses and was introduced in 2001. For more details, see Martin et al (2009). 
8 This is not to say that the UK should introduce a German-style feed-in tariff system, which has supported some 
types of renewable generation technologies too excessively (see http://repec.rwi-
essen.de/files/REP_08_040.pdf). 
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Another concern about carbon prices is their volatility, in particular, within the European 
Union’s Emissions Trading System (ETS).9
 
  
Figure 4 gives some idea of this uncertainty by reporting the distribution of price estimates 
reported in interviews with almost 800 managers in six European countries.10
 
 Note that while 
the average price is almost £40 per tonne of CO2, the 90th percentile price expectation is more 
than three times that of the 10th percentile. 
The problem with such uncertainty is that an efficient response to climate change requires 
huge sunk investments, both in R&D but also in fixed assets such as new power generation 
plants. Private investors will rationally respond to this uncertainty by delaying investment and 
innovation decisions.11
 
 Reducing uncertainty of the price signal should be an important part 
of climate change policy-making. 
There are at least three elements to this volatility: 
 
• First, narrow carbon market uncertainty – that is, uncertainty about the carbon needs 
and behaviour of other carbon market participants. 
 
• Second, uncertainty about the wider economic environment – for example, the 
business cycle, oil prices etc. 
 
• And third, uncertainty over the entire future direction of climate change policy. 
 
While wider economic volatility cannot be easily influenced by the government, the other 
types of volatility are directly under its remit. In particular, carbon market uncertainty would 
almost disappear completely if instead of using a carbon trading system, the government 
simply imposed a carbon tax. To reduce uncertainty over future climate change policy, 
government credibility is important so legally binding targets, the Committee on Climate 
                                                 
9 Figure 2 gives a flavour of this by showing that the average price for 2008 was almost 50% higher than for 
2009.  
10 This is based on the study reported in more detail in Anderson et al (2010). 
11 CEP research shows large "delay" effects of uncertainty on investment and R&D (e.g., Bloom et al, 2007). 
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Change and cross-party support are all helpful. 
 
Providing direct funding for particularly large and fixed elements of the required investments 
– for example, investments in electricity grid infrastructure – similarly send a signal of policy 
commitment to the private sector.  
 
A more radical idea12
 
 to reduce uncertainty is for the government to issue options contracts 
that can be exercised if certain elements of climate change legislation are not enacted or the 
price of carbon drops below a certain level.  
 
Figure 4: Carbon price expectations by European industry in 2020 
 
Source: 800 managers were asked to estimate what they expected the price of carbon to be in 2020. Author’s 
calculations based on CEP’s climate change management interviews 
 
 
In the proposals of all the main parties, there are statements suggesting that a carbon price is 
an important element of climate change policy-making. In the case of Labour, this is confined 
to support for the EU’s ETS as well as maintaining the CCL in its current form. 
 
Both the LibDems and the Conservatives13
 
 go further in that they want to reform the CCL 
into a genuine carbon tax – that is, with the tax rate set in relation to the carbon content of 
energy fuels – and to use the CCL as a tool to create a floor price for carbon to the extent that 
the EU ETS does not deliver a meaningful price. 
The Conservatives want to maintain, however, the current exemption of the non-business 
energy consumption from the CCL as well as the exemptions granted under the CCA. The 
LibDems are suggesting removing these exemptions. The LibDems’ plans would therefore go 
furthest in establishing a more homogenous carbon price. Both LibDems and Conservatives 
stop short, however, of announcing what the floor price path would be or how exactly it 
would be determined. So it remains an open question whether any of these plans would 
establish a carbon price high enough to induce change. 
 
                                                 
12 Neuhoff and Ismer (2009), Mainelli and Onstwedder (2009) 
13 As detailed in ‘Rebuilding Security – Conservative Energy Policy for an Uncertain World’ 
(http://www.conservatives.com/~/media/Files/Green%20Papers/Rebuilding-Security.ashx?dl=true). 
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There is broad support across the parties for direct government support in expanding the 
electricity grid – to make it more accessible for far off renewable power locations – as well as 
transforming it into a ‘smart grid’, easing the demand-side balancing of more volatile 
renewable electricity supply. As argued above, such measures can be a helpful, signalling 




Selling climate change policy to voters 
 
The prime driver for climate change policy is to mitigate the risk of costs of the order of 20% 
of GDP or more14
 
 arising within the next five to ten decades by spending a much smaller cost 
today. The fundamental problem with this is that the people who are supposed to incur that 
smaller cost today are not the same ones who are going to benefit in the future. 
The parties are therefore motivating their push for climate change policies by suggesting that 
the UK can benefit even in the short run by becoming a global leader in clean technologies 
and reaping growth and employment benefits from selling those technologies to the rest of the 
world. How likely is this? 
 
• First, there is a lot of competition for this global leader position, and the UK is coming 
rather late to the game as Figure 5 shows. In terms of patents in clean technologies, 
the UK is currently in sixth position, with innovators from countries such as Germany, 
Japan or the United States holding more than three times as many patents as UK 
innovators. Worse, when looking only at the more recent period 2002-07, the UK is 
even falling behind China and South Korea. 
 
• Second, even if UK innovators are ahead in some technologies, it is not clear that this 
will lead to dramatic employment or productivity gains for the UK. Manufacturing of 
those technologies might still take place elsewhere.  
 
• Third, employment and growth in clean technology areas, while good for people 
specialised in these areas, does not necessarily imply welfare gains – in the short run – 
for the population as a whole or relative to a scenario where perhaps other new 
sectors15
 
 would have grown much faster. Politicians therefore need to be careful in 
overselling green growth arguments as it might lead to a backlash against climate 
change policies if these promises do not materialise. 
An even more fundamental question concerns the overall effectiveness of climate change 
policy considering that emerging economics such as India and China may not curb emissions. 
Since the UK is only responsible for about 2% of global emissions, unilateral policies will 
have little influence if others do not follow suit. 
 
One important channel that allows the UK to punch above its carbon weight is again 
technology. The adoption of climate change policies will not only reduce UK pollution but 
                                                 
14 According to the Stern Review (2007). 
15 For example, biotechnology. 
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also induce innovation in clean technologies.16
 
 To the extent that this makes those 
technologies cheaper or more user-friendly, it also facilitates their introduction to emerging 
economies. While this entails the possibility of a net cost for UK voters in the short run, it 
could be justified on the grounds of historical responsibility and the greater current 
capabilities of rich countries such as the UK. 
 
Figure 5: Share of clean energy patents 
 
Note: the figure reports the average share in patents across 15 climate change related technology categories 
Source: Dechezleprêtre and Martin (2010) 
 
 
Another important concern for political feasibility is the distributional consequences of 
climate change policies. It is well established that carbon prices on their own have a 
regressive effect because the spending of lower income groups implicitly contains more 
carbon.17
 
 A related concern is that carbon-pricing schemes are perceived as yet another 
government scheme to extract money from taxpayers. To address both concerns, additional 
revenue from carbon pricing should be channelled back into the economy in a revenue-neutral 
and progressive way – that is, so that lower income groups benefit more. 
While current carbon pricing revenues are by and large revenue-neutral, they are not 
necessarily progressive. The revenue from the CCL is used to lower employers’ national 
insurance contribution as well as to fund a number of energy efficiency programmes that the 
government is running. 
 
Within the EU’s ETS, emissions permits have so far been by and large handed out for free to 
the most carbon-intensive businesses, rather than auctioned so that taxpayers could benefit. 
                                                 
16Although not necessarily for UK innovators or to the net short-term benefit of UK residents as argued earlier. 
Related to this, see Dechezleprêtre (2009), which shows that climate change policy in one country can have as 
much of an effect on foreign innovators as on domestic ones.  
17 See, for example, Grainger and Kolstad (2009). 
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Despite the European Commission’s stated to goal to auction most permits, free allocation of 
a large share of the permits will continue for the foreseeable future under current plans.18
 
 
The UK political parties discuss the regressive implications of carbon pricing under the 
heading of ‘fuel poverty’. To address it, they propose a variety of measures focused on 
making the homes of low-income groups more energy efficient. These range from outright 
grants (for example, the government’s Warm Front Programme) and subsidised credit 
schemes for energy efficiency improvements (for example, the Conservatives’ ‘Just do it’ 
Scheme or the LibDems’ Energy Mortgages) to obligations for energy suppliers to ensure 
installation of a certain amount of energy saving measures among energy customers (a 
scheme currently dubbed Carbon Emission Reduction Target, CERT).19
 
  
Generally these schemes appear very bureaucratic with considerable effort by government to 
establish who is qualified and which measures qualify. There are also concerns that these 
programmes target the wrong people.20
 
 
Moreover, these schemes can only address adverse effects related to direct energy 
consumption. But the regressive effects of carbon prices operate equally through the carbon 
content of the goods that low-income groups consume. As carbon pricing policies become 
more stringent, it would therefore seem necessary to have schemes in place that more broadly 
and more simply ensure revenue neutrality as well as correction of distributional effects. A 
very simple and effective measure could be to re-distribute directly any revenues in the form 




Supporting technology and innovation 
 
If supporting clean technology is a key objective of climate change policy, are there lessons 
for policy design? From an economic point of view, a stable and sufficiently high carbon 
price is the best instrument. High prices induce upfront R&D investments and allow 
businesses rather than bureaucrats to choose the best way to get green technologies.  
 
Some evidence that stringent carbon pricing is likely to work comes from the much higher 
rates of clean innovation during the oil price hikes of the early 1980s (see Figure 6).22
 
 In 
addition, directly subsidising R&D is justified on the grounds that there are spillovers 
associated with an innovation – that is, benefits arising from the innovation for which the 
innovator is not rewarded appropriately. 
Another motivation for measures beyond the carbon price could be credit constraints, that is, 
where firms or individuals cannot pursue a high value innovation because they cannot obtain 
the necessary credit; importantly, not because the innovation is not promising but because 
creditors have difficulty establishing the potential of the innovation.  
                                                 
18 See Martin et al (2010) for details. 
19 This legislation is the driving force behind the eagerness of a wide range of companies and charities to give 
away energy saving light bulbs for free. 
20 See the evaluation of the Warm Front Programme by the National Audit Office 
(http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/0809/the_warm_front_scheme.aspx). 
21 Hence unlike Mrs Thatcher’s plans for a poll tax, which would have been very regressive, a poll subsidy 
would give lower income groups a larger fraction of their income back, thereby acting progressively. 
22 See Popp (2002) for more systematic evidence. 
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Source: Dechezleprêtre and Martin (2010) 
 
 
Factors such as these would suggest that any such funding should be channelled to basic 
research and areas where knowledge spillovers and credit constraints are more likely to arise. 
A glance at the project portfolio of the Energy Technology Institute, the main government 
outlet for such research money, would suggest that this is not the case at the moment.23
 
 
Another concern is that there is not much evidence that knowledge spillovers or credit 
constraints are more of an issue for clean technologies than other technologies. The question 
therefore arises why it is necessary to create new institutions that specifically deal with 
research funding in this area rather than channelling such funding through established 
channels. 
 
All parties express the goal of being technology-neutral when it comes to supporting new 
clean technologies. Despite this stated objective, there appears to be quite a bit of technology 
tinkering in the proposals. The Labour government has recently introduced the ‘banding’ of 
the renewable obligation, implying that different technology types attract different amounts of 
‘renewable obligation certificates’ per unit of supplied electricity. 
 
The Conservatives are now following the LibDems in their plans to abandon the renewable 
obligation scheme altogether and to replace it with a system of feed-in tariffs – that is, a 
guaranteed price for renewable electricity supplied to the grid that is above normal market 
prices. Similar to the banding introduced by Labour, different types of technology would 
attract different feed-in tariff rates. 
 
Either scheme implies that different types of renewable technology get different levels of 
support per kWh of electricity produced, depending on what the government deems a more 
established as opposed to an emerging technology. Such differentiation is unhelpful in that it 
makes it more difficult to establish which technologies are actually the cheapest, it leads to 
                                                 
23 http://www.energytechnologies.co.uk 
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misallocation of investments and it creates special interests that are likely to lobby for 
prolonged support of those special handouts.  
 
The same holds for plans put forward by all parties to introduce more generous feed-in tariffs 
for small-scale renewable electricity production (for example, via rooftop solar panels). Any 
bureaucratic barriers that make it difficult for small-scale suppliers to connect to the grid 
should be removed. But providing them with an implicit subsidy higher than for other 
renewable types is likely to lead to unnecessary additional costs. 
 
 
Nuclear power – a dividing line between the parties 
 
A major difference between the main parties’ proposal on electricity generation technologies 
concerns the treatment of nuclear. Both Labour and the Conservatives support new nuclear 
power plants whereas the LibDems categorically oppose the nuclear option. In principle, there 
is no need for governments to be either in favour or against nuclear as long they create a level 
playing field relative to other generation technologies without government subsidies, which 
nuclear attracted plentifully in the past. 
 
Labour and the Conservatives pay lip service to this idea. But there are several aspects 
affecting the costs of nuclear generation potentially creating implicit hidden subsidies that 
still have to be addressed. The first is the question of nuclear waste, where the government 
has not yet worked out a long-term strategy for underground storage of such waste. Costs 
arising from this would need to be fully borne by the operators of any new nuclear plants. 
 
The second is the question of liability in case of a major accident in a nuclear installation. It 
appears that the UK has a rather lax approach by limiting operator liability at a low level 
compared with other countries, which often impose unlimited liability and more stringent 
requirements on securing these obligations (see Table 1). This would render costs of nuclear 
lower for the operators than they are in reality. 
 
Besides keeping the costs between different renewable generation technologies level – that is, 
within the power sector – it would also be advisable for efficiency and transparency to 
equalise the carbon costs between the power sector and other sectors of the economy. Thus, 
rather than creating a separate system, such as either the renewable obligation or a feed-in 
tariff, clean generation technologies could derive their support from a reformed and vastly 
more stringent24
 
 CCL as discussed above. 
To minimise uncertainty, such a tax could be designed to guarantee a minimum price for the 
main fossil energy carriers, that is, coal and gas. Thus the government would guarantee25 that 
the gas price after carbon tax would never drop beyond a certain level.26
 
  
To fine-tune this policy, a body such as the Climate Change Committee could tighten the 
guaranteed level over time if the initially suggested level turns out to be insufficient to meet 
                                                 
24 That is, on the order of £40 or more per tonne of CO2 rather than £6 as it is now. 
25 Potentially by issuing appropriate option contracts (See footnote 13). 
26 Indexing the carbon price to the fossil fuel price would also address recent concerns about excess profits for 
renewable operators in the event of oil price hikes (see Ofgem: 
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Media/PressRel/Documents1/16662-R5.pdf). 
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the challenges. Such a policy – where the carbon tax target is linked to the price of fossil fuels 
– would not only hedge against general uncertainty in fossil fuel markets but also against 
deliberate attempts of fossil fuel producers to sabotage climate policy by price reductions.27
 
 
Of course as discussed above, any proceeds from such a tax should be channelled back to 
taxpayers in a revenue-neutral way. 
 




Risking competitiveness and jobs? 
 
Strong unilateral climate change policy entails the risk that firms might shift production to 
jurisdictions without such regulation, thereby leading to job loss. This would also jeopardise 
the objective of inducing innovation: rather than inventing new technology, firms simply use 
the old technologies abroad. 
 
Anderson et al (2010) examine the likelihood of downsizing or outsourcing arising from 
climate change policies, and find very few sectors where this is a big problem. What’s more, 
compared with other major European economies such as France or Germany, this risk appears 





There is a great deal of overlap between the parties’ proposals on climate change policy. 
The 2008 Climate Change Bill, which was backed by the opposition parties, has created a 
sensible overarching framework for climate change policy-making. This framework must now 
be filled with more detailed policy measures that can induce change. 
 
From an economic point of view, it is central that a uniform, sufficiently high and predictable 
carbon price signal is established. Through a variety of policies, usage of carbon and other 
greenhouse gases is already costly to emit in the UK. But these prices differ greatly depending 
on where such emissions occur. There is also much uncertainty over what these carbon costs 
will be in years to come. 
                                                 
27 See Sinn (2007) for a discussion. 
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There is some sensitivity in the parties’ proposals to these issues, particularly with the 
Conservative and LibDem plans to reform the Climate Change Levy into a genuine carbon tax 
and use it to hedge against uncertainty in the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme. 
The LibDems’ plans – to extend the levy to the non-business sector and crack down on 
various other exemptions currently granted – are most comprehensive proposal to create a 
homogenous carbon price. Both parties are stopping short, however, of specifying how high 
this floor price should be. 
 
The parties should be careful in overselling the short-run benefits in terms of job creation and 
growth from climate change policies. 
 
All parties have proposals for differential treatment of different ‘clean’ generation 
technologies. Labour and the Conservatives support further nuclear power plants whereas the 
LibDems are opposed to nuclear. Giving differential support to different technologies risks 
inefficiencies and unnecessary costs.  
 
Rather than creating a separate system, demand-side support for renewable technologies could 
be integrated with wider efforts to establish a carbon price. The suggested price floor for 
carbon could be indexed to fossil fuel prices, both to hedge the risk for the ‘clean’ technology 
and generation industry and avoid excessive profits in the event of future oil price hikes. 
 
Any meaningful carbon price will be fiscally regressive unless accompanied by compensating 
measures. The current plans of the parties lack practical proposals to address this. The 
simplest measure could be to channel all revenue arising from carbon back to UK residents in 
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